Copyright\u27s First Compulsory License by Abrams, Howard B.
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 26 | Issue 2 Article 2
2010
Copyright's First Compulsory License
Howard B. Abrams
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Howard B. Abrams, Copyright's First Compulsory License, 26 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 215 (2009).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol26/iss2/2
COPYRIGHT'S FIRST COMPULSORY LICENSE
Howard B. Abramst
Abstract
This article discusses the development of the compulsory license
for making phonorecords of nondramatic musical works in the
Copyright Act of 1909 and the continued existence of this compulsory
license in subsequent iterations of copyright law. Drawing on this
background, the paper then argues that, however useful the
compulsory license may have been in the past, it is no longer a useful
means to promote the creation of intellectual works and should be
repealed.
In particular, the paper highlights several factors that compel
the conclusion that compulsory licenses are an outdated concept and
should be repealed. In particular, the article focuses on how
compulsory licenses deviate from the traditional bargain struck by
copyright law, the lack of moral rights under the present system, the
debatability of the assertion that repeal of the compulsory license will
result in a sufficient quantity of exclusive licenses that will not only be
exclusive but will harm the public interest, the lack of anti-monopoly
concerns in the modern marketplace, and a belief that private
negotiation will result in fairer treatment of the authors of non-
dramatic musical compositions.
Both the first recognition of a recording right for music and the
first compulsory license provision in American copyright law were
given birth in section 1(e) of the 1909 Copyright Revision Act.'
t Howard B. Abrams is Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law.
Thanks are due to Nina Dodge Abrams, Helene Blue, David Carson, Mike DiNapoli and Laurie
Jakobsen for variously inspiring, helping with and commenting upon this article. Thanks are
also due to the Santa Clara University School of Law for sponsoring a Conference on the 100th
Anniversary of the 1909 Copyright Act at which an early draft of this paper was presented, to
Tyler T. Ochoa and Pamela Samuelson for planning the Conference, and to Johnathan R. Elton
and Aileen Kim of the Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal for their help
editing this article.
1. An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35
Stat. 1075 (March 4, 1909, effective July 1, 1909) [hereinafter 1909 Copyright Act].
These types of licenses are also commonly called "statutory licenses," which is arguably the
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Rephrasing section 1(e) 2 in the terminology of the current Copyright
Act,3 once phonorecords 4 of a nondramatic musical work5 have been
more descriptive term. This article uses the term "compulsory license" as that is the term used in
section 115 of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §115 (2006). The Copyright Act is not consistent in
its terminology. For example, the term "statutory license" is used in section 111(d). 17 U.S.C. §
111(d) (2006) (secondary transmissions by cable television systems). Sections 116 and 118
provide a statutory/compulsory license in the absence of a negotiated agreement without using
either of those terms. 17 U.S.C. §§ 116 & 118 (2006) (116: juke box performances of
copyrighted non-dramatic musical compositions; 118: noncommercial broadcasts of published
nondramatic musical works and published pictorial, graphic and sculptural works).
The United States first included musical compositions as copyrightable subject matter in 1831.
An Act to amend the several acts relating to copyrights, Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat.
436 (Peters ed. 1846). A right of performance for music was first included in the United States
copyright laws in 1897. An Act to amend title sixty, chapter three of the Revised Statutes
relating to copyrights, ch. 4, § 1, 29 Stat. 481-82 (1897).
2. In relevant part, section 1(e) of the 1909 Copyright Act provided:
That any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the conditions of
this Act, shall have the exclusive right:
(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical
composition; and for the purpose of public performance public performance for
profit; and for the purposes set forth in subsection (a) hereof, to make any
arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any
form or record in which the thought of an author may be recorded and from
which it may be read or reproduced: Provided, That the provisions of this title, so
far as they secure copyright controlling the parts of instruments serving to
reproduce mechanically the musical work, shall include only compositions
published and copyrighted after July 1, 1909, and shall not include the works of a
foreign author or composer unless the foreign state or nation of which such
author or composer is a citizen of subject grants, either by treaty, convention,
agreement, or law, to the citizens of the United States similar rights. And
provided further, and as a condition of extending the copyrighted control to such
mechanical reproductions, That whenever the owner of a musical copyright has
used or permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the use of the copyrighted work
upon parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work,
any other person may make similar use of the copyrighted work upon the
payment to the copyright proprietor of a royalty of two cents on each such part
manufactured, to be paid by the manufacturer thereof; ....
1909 Copyright Act, supra note 1, § 1(e) (emphasis added).
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2006).
4. " 'Phonorecords' are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known
or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of machine or device. The term 'phonorecords'
includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
5. The term "musical work" is not defined in the current Copyright Act although it is
one of the categories used to classify copyrightable works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006). Nor is
the term "nondramatic musical work" defined although this is the category of works to which
the compulsory license provision applies. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
Although neither term is defined, the current Copyright Act draws a distinction between
"musical works, including any accompanying words," 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006), and
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distributed to the public in the United States under the authority of the
copyright owner, any other person can make an independent sound
recording 6 of that musical composition and then manufacture and
distribute phonorecords of that sound recording provided they comply
with the statutory requirements.7 In its essential form-payment of a
royalty to permit the making of a sound recording of a nondramatic
musical composition without the consent of the music's copyright
owner-this compulsory license persists to this day.
I. ORIGINS
Why and how did this provision find its way into the 1909
Copyright Act? Turning back the clock to the incubation of the 1909
Copyright Act 9, this was a period of significant growth of both player
pianos'o and the earlier forms of recorded music." Any hope by the
"dramatic works, including any accompanying music." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(3) (2006).
6. " 'Sound Recordings' are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical,
spoken or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other
phonorecords, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
7. 1909 Copyright Act, supra note 1, § 1(e). The current version of this compulsory
license is found at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
8. Compare 1909 Copyright Act, supra note 1, § 1(e) with 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
9. A six volume compilation of the legislative history documents for the 1909 Copyright
Act exists. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe
Goldman ed.) (1976) [hereinafter 1909 ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
For a brief overview of the 1905-1909 efforts to revise the Copyright Act, see generally, Abe A.
Goldman, The History of the U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision from 1901 to 1954, COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., STUDIES PREPARED
FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY 1-4 (Comm. Print 1960) (Study No. 1) [hereinafter Goldman, Copyright Law
Revision 1901-1954]. For a more detailed consideration of the legislative history of section 1(e)
of the 1909 Copyright Act. see Harry G. Henn, The Compulsory License Provisions of the U.S.
Copyright Law, COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG.,
IST SESS., STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY 1-21 (Comm. Print 1960) (Study No. 5)
[hereinafter Henn, The Compulsory License].
There was considerable interest in revising the copyright laws from many sources other than the
music industry. President Theodore Roosevelt in a message to Congress in December 2005,
stated:
Our copyright laws urgently need revision. They are imperfect in definition,
confused and inconsistent in expression; they omit provision for many articles
which, under modem reproductive processes, are entitled to protection, they
impose hardships upon the copyright proprietor which are not essential to the fair
protection of the public; they are difficult for the courts to interpret and
impossible for the Copyright Office to administer with satisfaction to the public.
Goldman, Copyright Law Revision 1901-1954. Sound familiar?
10. 11 RUSSELL SANJEK, AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC AND ITS BUSINESS-THE FIRST
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music publishersl 2 of the day that their copyrights would prevent
unauthorized embodiment of a performance of a musical composition
in player piano rolls or other mechanical devices, which reproduced a
performance of the music, was finally laid to rest by the Supreme
Court in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.'" White-
Smith held that the unauthorized embodiment of a song in a player
piano roll did not infringe the copyright in the song.14 The essential
rationale of the Supreme Court's decision was that a player piano roll
was not a "copy" within the meaning of the then current Copyright
Act15 because it could not be understood by the naked human eye.' 6
FOUR HUNDRED YEARS-FROM 1790 TO 1909 380-83 (1988) [hereinafter 11 SANJEK].
According to Sanjek, player pianos constituted "one out of every eight of the 354,545 pianos
manufactured in 1909 to a peak, in 1921, of 208,541 of the 341,652 made and sold that year."
Id. at 383.
Russell Sanjek's three volume set is both invaluable and frustrating. It is really the only work
that brings together a detailed history of the business side of American popular music from its
beginnings in the colonial era through 1984. An examination of the extensive bibliographies
shows how exhaustive an effort went into researching the material for these volumes. I RUSSELL
SANJEK, AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC AND ITS BUSINESS-THE FIRST FOUR HUNDRED YEARS-
FROM THE BEGINNING TO 1790, 423-39 (1988); II SANJEK, AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC AND
ITS BUSINESS-THE FIRST FOUR HUNDRED YEARS-FROM 1790 TO 1909, 421-46 (1988); 111
RUSSELL SANJEK, AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC AND ITS BUSINESS-THE FIRST FOUR HUNDRED
YEARS-FROM 1900 TO 1984, 655-93 (1988) [hereinafter III SANJEK]. At the same time, the
absence of footnotes or endnotes leaves the reader maddeningly frustrated at trying to connect
Sanjek's statements with the underlying source material supporting that statement.
11. For a description of the invention and evolution of recorded music from its inception
through 1909, see II SANJEK, supra note 10, 363-68, 383-91. See also http://www.recording-
history.org/HTML/phonojtechnologyl.php. The rise of commercial distribution of the early
Twentieth Century counterparts of today's phonorecords in the 1900's is testified to by the fact
that the first sound recording to sell 1,000,000 copies worldwide was Enrico Caruso's 1907
recording of Recitar! . .. Vesti La Giubba from Ruggero Leoncavallo's opera PAGLIACCI, which
pre-dated the 1909 Copyright Act. See also
http://www.sonybmgmasterworks.com/artists/enricocaruso/.
12. In essence, these are the owners of copyrights in musical compositions. They are
called music publishers because prior to sound recordings and rights in public performances,
their source of income was the sale of sheet music which they published. Today, sales of printed
music are no longer the major source of income for music publishers, having been surpassed by
compulsory licenses from phonorecords and performance royalties. As a result, most music
publishers, even the major ones, do not print music but license the print rights to a relatively
small number of music print houses.
13. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1(1908), aff'g 147 F. 226 (2d
Cir. 1906), af'g 139 F. 427 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905).
14. Id. at 18.
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, sec. 1, § 4952, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107 (amending Rev. Stat.
§ 4952). This provision gave "[t]he author . .. of any . . . musical composition ... the sole
liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and
vending the same." Id.
16. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17. In his concurrence, Justice Holmes argued that this view
was mistaken but went along with the majority because both domestic and foreign precedents
2010] COPYRIGHT'S FIRST COMPULSORY LICENSE 219
Because it was not a copy, it did not violate the copyright owner's
exclusive right to make copies of the work. 17
It cannot be said this decision was unexpected as prior lower
court decisions on the issue had also held against the music publishers
on similar grounds.' 8 Even before the Supreme Court's decision, the
music publishers, much as today's intellectual property owners do
when there is a setback, appealed to Congress for a legislative fix.' 9
Starting with the first bills introduced in the efforts culminating in the
1909 Copyright Act, there were provisions granting copyright owners
exclusive rights to record audio versions of their works.2 0
Hovering over this effort was the specter, perhaps more
imagined than real, of a cartel of music publishers exercising
monopoly power over the recording of music. Eighty-seven members
of the Music Publishers Association controlling 381,598 compositions
had agreed to give the Aeolian Company exclusive rights to
were in favor of the position taken by the Court. Id. at 18-20.
17. Id. at 18.
18. See, e.g., Stem v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (1901); Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F.
584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 643 (1892). Accord M. Witmark & Sons
v. Standard Music Roll Co., 213 F. 552 (D.N.J. 1914), aff'd, 221 F. 376 (3d Cir. 1915) (pre-
1909 work).
19. See generally II SANJEK supra note 10 at 397-401; Henn, The Compulsory License,
supra note 9 at 2-12.
20. S. 6330, 59th Cong. § 1(g) (1906); H.R. 19853, 59th Cong. § 1(g) (1906) ("That the
copyright secured by this Act shall include the sole and exclusive right ... (g) To make, sell,
distribute, or let for hire any device, contrivance, or appliance especially adapted in any manner
whatsoever to reproduce to the ear the whole or any material part of any work published and
copyrighted after this Act shall have gone into effect, or by means of any such device or
appliance publicly to reproduce to the ear the whole or any material part of such work.").
A similar provision was contained in § 1(e) in the Senate Bill introduced in the next session of
Congress. S. 8190, 59th Cong. § 1(e) (1907). The companion bill in the House of
Representatives; H.R. 25133, 59th Cong. (1907), originally contained the same section 1(g) as
1906 bills. The House Committee, however, struck this to wait upon the result in the White-
Smith case, White-Smith, 209 U.S. 1, then pending before the Supreme Court. H.R. REP. No.
59-7083, at 9 (1907). The Committee Report stated: "Should the court sustain the contention of
the plaintiff in that case, the musical composers and publishers will probably secure all they
sought to obtain by enactment of the provision mentioned, and should the court hold the other
way, Congress can then take up the question of giving further protection to musical authors, if it
deem it wise to do so, in a separate bill. Id.
In the Sixtieth Congress, after the Supreme Court had handed down the White-Smith decision,
section 1(e) of the respective House and Senate bills assumed it final form. Compare 1909
Copyright Act, supra note 1, § 1(e), with H.R. 28192, 60th Cong. § 1(e) (1909) and S. 9440,
60th Cong. 1(e) (1909). See also H.R. REP. No. 60-2222 at, 4-9 (1909), and S. REP. No. 60-
1108, at 4-9 (1909).
There were other bills regarding copyright and the proposed recording right during the run up to
the 1909 Copyright Act, see Henn, supra note 9, at 3-12, but these are the principal ones leading
up to the 1909 Copyright Act.
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manufacture piano rolls of their copyrighted compositions in return
for a royalty of ten per cent of the retail selling price of the piano
rolls. 21 The other 117 music publishing firms, controlling 503,597
compositions, were not parties to the deal.22 The Aeolian Company
was the dominant manufacturer of player pianos.2 3 As part of the deal,
the Aeolian Company had apparently financed the prosecution of the
White-Smith case.24
This led to an outcry against this potential monopoly.25 Congress
concluded that "[n]ot only would there be a possibility of a great
music trust in this country and abroad, but arrangements are actively
being made to bring it about." 26 To prevent the emergence of this
"great music trust" while still rewarding composers and lyricists a
reward from the sales of phonorecords, Congress provided that after
the copyright owner had made or authorized or acquiesced in the
making of "parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically
the musical work," 27 any other person could do the same upon
payment of a royalty to the copyright owner.28
How was that royalty to be determined? Given its fears of a
monopoly, Congress chose to set the rate legislatively rather than
permit the possibility of monopoly pricing.29 Various formulas for
determining the compulsory license royalty rates appeared in the
different bills introduced in Congress. 30 Congress ultimately chose the
21. III SANJEKsupra note 10, at 22-23.
22. 111 SANJEK supra note 10, at 22-23.
23. III SANJEK supra note 10, at 23. The Aeolian Company's player piano, The Pianola,
was patented and thus only Aeolian player pianos could play Aeolian piano rolls.
24. Claire R. LaRoche et al., Online Music Piracy: Are Lawsuits The Best Approach?, J.
OF BUS. AND ECON. RES., Sept. 2004, 1, available at http://www.cluteinstitute-
onlinejoumals.com/PDFs/200492.pdf.
25. See, inter alia, Arguments Before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and House
of Representatives on the Bills S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, to Amend and Consolidate the Acts
Respecting Copyright, 59th Cong. (1906), reprinted in 4 1909 ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 9, at 96-146 (Statements of G. Howlett Davis, John J. O'Connell, H. N. Low and
S.T. Cameron).
26. H.R. REP. No. 60-2222 at 8 (1909), and S. REP. NO. 60-1108 at 8 (1909).
27. 1909 Copyright Act, supra note 1, § 1(e). To this day, the music industry refers to
these licenses as "mechanical licenses" and the royalties as "mechanical royalties" or
"mechanicals."
28. Id.
29. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
30. H.R. 21592, 60th Cong., Ist Sess. (1908) ("a royalty equal to the royalty agreed to be
paid by the licensee paying the lowest rates of royalty for instruments of the same class"); H.R.
21984, 60th Cong., Ist Sess. (1908) (two cent royalty for a "talking machine record," one-tenth
of the "marked retail price" otherwise); H.R. 22071, 60th Cong., Ist Sess. (1908) (10% of retail
price); H.R. 22183, 60th Cong., Ist Sess. (1908) (two cent royalty, but if it was "disks for
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flat rate of two cents per copy royalty on these "parts of
instruments." 1
Thus, section 1(e) of the 1909 Copyright Revision Act,
copyright's first compulsory license, provided copyright owners with
compensation for, if not insulation from, the otherwise unauthorized
"use[s] of the copyrighted work upon the parts of instruments serving
to reproduce mechanically the musical work."32
II. REPEAL OR RETENTION
Should the compulsory license for phonorecords be continued or
should it be scrapped?
This issue was seriously raised during the revision process
leading to the 1976 Copyright Revision Act.3 3 Because the arguments
talking machines not exceeding eight inches in diameter or cylinders not exceeding four inches
in length," the one cent); H.R. 24782, 60th Cong, 2d Sess. (1908) (same rate as licensed to
others by copyright owner; if used only by the copyright owner, then 10% of the selling price
but not less than two cents); H.R. 25162, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909) ("ten per centum of the
selling price of any such instrument, but in no event to be less than two cents . . .or if the use is
permitted to others, the royalty provided in the contract"); H.R. 27310, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1909) ("five per centum of the sum derived bona fide by the manufacturer thereof, from the
manufacture, use, sale, or lease of such parts"); H.R. 28192, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1(e) (1909)
and S. 9440, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. §l(e) (1909) (two cent flat rate). H.R. 28192 and S. 9440 are
essentially identical. H.R. 28192 was enacted as the 1909 Copyright Act.
31. 1909 Copyright Act, supra note 1, § 1(e).
32. 1909 Copyright Act, supra note 1, § 1(e). The copyright owner was placed under an
affirmative obligation to file notice of its use of the composition on "parts of instruments" as a
precondition for receiving these royalties. Provided this was done, the copyright owner was
entitled to be paid monthly on the twentieth day of the succeeding month and could require the
payment be accompanied by a report by the manufacturer under oath of the number of parts
manufactured. Id.
33. An Act for the general revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L. 94-553, Tit. I, SEC.
101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976; effective Jan. 1, 1978) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-805
(2006)) [hereinafter 1976 Copyright Revision Act].
The legislative origins of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act can be traced back to 1955 when
Congress appropriated funds for the Copyright Office to prepare studies of the problems in the
then existing Copyright Act. Legislative Appropriations Act of 1955, ch. 568, 69 Stat. 499
(1955). This resulted in 35 studies of problems which were published over the period from 1960
through 1963. A two volume collection of these studies was published by the Copyright Society
of the U.S.A. STUDIES IN COPYRIGHT-ARTHUR FISHER MEMORIAL EDITION (Copyright
Society of the U.S.A. ed. 1963). After most of these studies had been completed, the Register of
Copyrights submitted a Report to Congress which began the process of proposals, conferences
and bills which culminated in the 1976 Copyright Revision Act. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION-REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
REVISIONS OF U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (H. Comm. on the Judiciary Print
July 7, 1961) [hereinafter 1961 REGISTER's REPORT]. The subsequent history of this legislative
effort and its documents is thoroughly and analytically indexed in THE KAMINSTEIN
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT: A COMPENDIUM AND ANALYTICAL INDEX OF MATERIALS
LEADING TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 (Alan Latman & James F. Lightstone ed. 1981-1985)
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and counter-arguments presented then are the same ones that persist
to this day, it is an appropriate starting point for an analysis of the
question.
In the 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights, the Register of
Copyrights proposed that the statutory mechanical license be
abandoned.34 The Register noted the arguments for removing the
statutory mechanical license. First, there was the deleterious effect of
the two cent royalty rate under the compulsory license that had not
kept pace with inflation.35 Second, the Register then noted that "[t]he
danger of a monopoly in the situation existing in 1909 was apparently
the sole reason for the compulsory license." 36 To the Register, this
reason was no longer valid. Third, the Register noted the argument
that "the fundamental principle of copyright-that the author is to
have the exclusive right to control the commercial exploitation of his
work-should apply to the recording of music, as it is applied to all
other kinds of works and to other means of exploiting music., 38
The Register then turned to the counter-arguments which
centered on the fear that the absence of the statutory mechanical
license would lead to exclusive licenses thus preventing or lessening
the number of cover recordings 39 of a musical composition. The
benefits of the non-exclusive compulsory license were seen to be:
(1) It provides the public with a variety of recordings of any
particular musical work, which might not be true if the copyright
owner could give an exclusive license to one record company.
(2) It enables smaller record companies to compete with the larger
(6 volumes).
34. 1961 REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 33, at 36. To allow the music industry time to
adjust to the absence of the mechanical compulsory license, the Register also proposed a one
year period before the repeal went into effect. Id.
35. Id. at 33.
36. Id. at 33.
37. Id. at 33.
The Register argued:
There are now hundreds of recording companies competing with one another,
and the music available for recording is widely scattered among hundreds of
competitive publishers. The market for recordings and the number and variety of
compositions recorded have increased tremendously. The volume of music
available for recording is immense and constantly growing. Much of the new
music remains unrecorded, and no one can foretell whether a recording of a
particular composition will strike the public fancy.
Id.
38. Id. at 33.
39. In the terminology of the music industry, a "cover recording" is a later recording of a
song that was previously recorded by another recording artist or group.
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ones by offering other recordings of the same music.
(3) It benefits authors and publishers by giving their works public
exposure through several different recordings, thereby increasing
their revenue from royalties. 40
The Register rebutted these assertions by pointing out that "the
removal of the compulsory license, however, would not necessarily
result in exclusive licenses being given."4 1 After all, if it really were
to the benefit of the songwriters and music publishers to have
multiple recordings, they would seek to issue non-exclusive licenses
to multiple companies.42 The Register also stated that it was
understood "that in those foreign countries having no compulsory
license, the recording of musical works is usually licensed
nonexclusively to any reputable company." 4 3 The Register continued:
It seems likely that in the absence of the compulsory license,
multiple recordings would still be licensed nonexclusively. If so,
the three benefits attributed to the compulsory license by the record
industry would still exist, but with these differences: the author or
publisher could refuse a license to a recorder whom he considered
irresponsible or for a recording he considered undesirable, and the
royalty rate would be fixed by free negotiation.44
Even under the assumption that the removal of the compulsory
license would result in the granting of exclusive licenses, the Register
"believe[d] that any loss of the three benefits flowing from multiple
recordings would be offset by other considerations."45 First, the
public's potential loss of multiple recordings of the same musical
composition would be offset because "[the public] would get
recordings of a greater number and variety of musical works."46 As to
the ability of a small record company to make competing records of a
big record company's hits, the Register commented that "this also
works the other way" in that "[m]any hits are now originated by small
companies; and their prospective hits are often smothered by records
of the same music brought out by larger companies having better
known performers and greater promotional facilities."4 7 The Register
40. 1961 REGISTER's REPORT, supra note 33, at 34.
41. Id. at 34.
42. Id. at 34.
43. Id. at 34. Cf infra note 160.
44. Id. at 34.
45. Id. at 34.
46. Id. at 34.
47. Id. at 34.
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continued: "There is little danger that the large companies would get
all the hits: in the popular field the number of compositions available
for recording is virtually inexhaustible, and which of them become
hits is unpredictable."48 Further, the abolition of the statutory
mechanical license would allow the publishers and songwriters to
choose between exclusive and non-exclusive licensing arrangements
as dictated by their own self-interest and the market. 4 9 The Register
argued this could very well benefit the new and unknown author
because granting an exclusive license might give them more initial
opportunity to have their works recorded while the new works of
successful authors might be more profitably licensed on a non-
exclusive basis."
Further, the Register enunciated two policy reasons strongly
favoring the repeal of the compulsory license. The first was that the
"[riemoval of the compulsory license would be likely to result in a
royalty rate, fixed by free negotiation."' Of equal, if not greater,
importance to the Register was the belief that in music as elsewhere in
copyright, the author should control the commercialization of the
author's work:
We have previously mentioned the fundamental principle of
copyright that the author should have the exclusive right to exploit
the market for his work, except where this would conflict with the
public interest. In the situation prevailing in 1909, the public
interest was thought to require the compulsory license to forestall
the danger of a monopoly of musical recordings. The compulsory
license is no longer needed for that purpose, and we see no other
public interest that now requires its retention.
The Register's proposal to repeal the statutory mechanical
license was met with opposition from enough of the music industry-
primarily the record companies-to forestall it. The Register issued a
Supplementary Report53 after a series of meetings with representatives
of various interested parties which summed up the discussions:
48. Id. at 34.
49. Id. at 35.
50. Id. at 34-35.
51. Id. at 35. This article will forbear from examining the economic pros and cons of free
markets versus regulated markets.
52. Id. at 35.
53. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JuDIcIARY, 89TH CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISIONS OF U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw-1965
REVISION BILL, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (Comm. Print May 1965) [hereinafter REGISTER'S
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT].
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During the discussions following the issuance of the [1961]
Report, it became apparent that record producers, small and large
alike, regard the compulsory license as too important to their
industry to accept its outright elimination. Moreover, while still
opposing the provision in principle, some copyright owners
implied that ultimately there might be advantages in ameliorating
the harsh and burdensome effects of the compulsory license rather
than doing away with it altogether; .... Finally, and perhaps most
important, there seemed to be a feeling that people in the industry
generally would rather bear those ills they have than fly to others
that they know not of.54
As the revision process moved into the stage of bills and
committee hearings, the record companies continued to raise the
objection of a potential music monopoly. In addition, some music
publishers, or at least enough of them to satisfy Congress, indicated
they could accept a continuation of the statutory mechanical license if
the royalty rate structure could be made more equitable. The
conclusion articulated by Congress in the committee reports
accompanying the 1976 Copyright Revision Act, was:
The fundamental question of whether to retain the compulsory
license or to do away with it altogether was a major issue during
earlier stages of the program for general revision of the copyright
law. At the hearings it was apparent that the argument on this point
had shifted, and the real issue was not whether to retain the
compulsory license but how much the royalty under it should be.56
Thus, Congress enacted section 115 of the 1976 Copyright Revision
Act,57  which preserved the compulsory license for making
phonorecords of nondramatic musical compositions first found in
section 1(e) of the 1909 Copyright Act58 with the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, now replaced by the Copyright Royalty Judges, to fix the
royalty rates.5 9
54. Id. at 53-54.
55. H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 66-67 (1967).
56. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 107 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 88 (1975).
57. 1976 Copyright Revision Act, supra note 33, tit. I, Sec. 101, § 115, 90 Stat. 2541,
2561-62 (1976; effective Jan. 1, 1978) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006)).
58. 1909 Copyright Act, supra note 1, § 1(e).
59. Compare 1976 Copyright Revision Act, supra note33, §§ 801-810 with 17 U.S.C. §§
801-805 (2006).
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III. CONSEQUENCES
A. Proliferation of the Compulsory License Mechanism
Perhaps the most obvious consequence of the 1909 Copyright
Act's compulsory license is that it created a precedent for Congress to
use still other compulsory or statutory licenses60 to resolve other
problems, perceived or real, between owners and users of copyrighted
works. Indeed, the mechanism has proved popular. This was first
evident in section 115 of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act,' which
carried forward the compulsory license for phonorecords with an
updated and revised version of section 1(e) of the 1909 Copyright
Act.62 Congress subsequently expanded this particular compulsory
licensing mechanism to include the delivery of the recording of a non-
dramatic musical composition by digital audio transmission.63 Three
additional compulsory licenses were added by the 1976 Copyright
Revision Act for (1) the secondary transmission of certain primary
transmissions (essentially designed to permit cable television to carry
over-the-air broadcast signals),6" (2) jukebox performances of
copyrighted music, 65 and (3) the broadcast of published nondramatic
musical works and published pictorial, graphic and sculptural works
by a public broadcasting entity. Three more compulsory licenses
have since been adopted for (1) secondary transmissions by satellite
carriers, "' (2) certain digital transmissions and delivery of sound
60. For purposes of this article, the term compulsory license is applied only to otherwise
unauthorized uses of copyrighted material that are permitted by the Copyright Act conditioned
on the payment of a fee. While it could be argued that certain exemptions from liability should
also be deemed compulsory licenses as they permit otherwise infringing acts to take place under
conditions imposed by the Copyright Act, see, e.g., 1976 Copyright Revision Act § 108
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006)) (permitting certain library copying of
copyrighted works), this article will follow general usage by referring to these statutorily
sanctioned but otherwise infringing uses of copyrighted material as exemptions or exceptions.
61. 1976 Copyright Revision Act, supra note33, § 115 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 115 (2006)).
62. 1909 Copyright Act, supra note 1, § 1(e). Compare 1976 Copyright Revision Act,
supra note 33, § 115 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006)).
63. Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006)).
64. 1976 Copyright Revision Act, supra note33, § lll(d) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §I ll(d) (2006)).
65. 1976 Copyright Revision Act, supra note33, § 116 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 116 (1976) (repealed 1993)).
66. 1976 Copyright Revision Act, supra note33, § 118 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 118 (2006)).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 119(2006).
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recordings68  and (3) the manufacture and importation of digital
recording devices.69 A bill that would create yet another compulsory
license to benefit performances embodied in sound recordings-as
opposed to composers, writers and music publishers-is currently
pending in Congress.70 Clearly, Congress has become fond of the
compulsory license as a mechanism to resolve problems involving
conflicts between copyright owners and those who wish to use
copyrighted works."
B. Creation of a Derivative Work Without Authorization from
the Copyright Owner of the Underlying Work
Although not nearly as obvious, the most salient fundamental
aspect of the compulsory license for the making of phonorecords of a
non-dramatic musical composition is that it sanctions the creation and
exploitation of a derivative work without the authorization of the
copyright owner of the derivative work.72 None of the other
compulsory licenses do so.7
The effect of section 115's compulsory license is to separate
control over the creation of further sound recording and the
subsequent manufacture and distribution of phonorecords embodying
the sound recording from the copyright owner of the underlying
musical composition once that composition had been recorded and
68. 17 U.S.C. §§ 114-115 (2006).
69. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2006).
70. H.R. 848, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
71. Clearly the question of whether using compulsory licenses in lieu of allowing free
markets to develop and negotiate their own licensing schemes, if any, is a serious issue. This
article will address it only in the context of the compulsory license for making sound recordings
and phonorecords of non-dramatic musical compositions. See infra text accompanying notes
154-163.
72. A sound recording falls squarely within the definition of a "derivative work" in the
current Copyright Act, which defines a "derivative work" as "a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)
(definition of"derivative work") (emphasis added).
The production of a sound recording of a previously composed musical composition may and
often does involve great talent and aesthetic judgment; nonetheless it is dependent upon the pre-
existence of the musical composition. The one possible exception is spontaneous improvisation
which is simultaneously recorded, but here the author, and thus the initial copyright owner, of
both the musical composition and the sound recording is arguably the same person.
73. Compare supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
The other mechanism by which copyright law permits the preparation and dissemination of a
derivative work is through the doctrine of fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 and the plethora of cases
and oceans of commentator's ink that has been spilled on the subject of fair use.
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distributed by or under the authority of the copyright owner. Thus,
this allows the creation of a derivative work 74 (the sound recording)
without the consent of the owner of the copyright in the underlying
work (the musical composition). This is a major exception from the
basic rule of contemporary American copyright law that only the
copyright owner can create or authorize the creation of a derivative
work. The consequences of this statutory empowerment to create
derivative works without the consent of the copyright owner of the
underlying work deserve careful consideration.
The point cannot be emphasized too strongly. The otherwise
unauthorized creation of a derivative work (the sound recording and
the phonorecords manufactured that embody the sound recording) by
invocation of the compulsory license leaves at large the issue of how
problems of overlap with the copyright in the underlying work are to
be resolved in the absence of either negotiated terms or statutory
resolutions. One problem is determining the respective rights of the
copyright owners of the underlying work and the derivative work
where both overlap in the absence of statutory provision. Congress
defined the conditions permitting the creation of an otherwise
unauthorized derivative work-complying with the conditions
required for the compulsory license-but obviously Congress did not
fully consider the subsequent issues that might arise. If some third
party made copies of the phonorecord, could the copyright owner of
the underlying musical work sue for infringement? Could the creator
or owner of the rights in the sound recording sue for infringement?
What would be the basis of the action? What about performances of
the work by means of the phonorecords? On a more modem note,
what about the moral rights, if any, of the author of the underlying
work? The answers to these questions came over time from a
combination ofjudicial precedents and state and federal legislation.
1. The Right of Performance in a Sound Recording
The issue of whether the creator of the derivative sound
74. "A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may
be adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative
work'." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006). None of the other compulsory licenses provided by the
current Copyright Act do this. They merely permit the performance, transmission or display of
certain copyrighted works under specified circumstances.
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recording could control the performance of the sound recording by
radio broadcast was litigated in the late 1930s. 76 The earliest courts
held that the performer making the derivative sound recording could
prevent its radio broadcast on theories of common law unfair
competition protecting non-statutory intellectual property from
unauthorized exploitation by third parties." These decisions were
effectively overruled by Learned Hand in RCA Manufacturing Co. v.
Whiteman,7 8 holding "that the 'common-law property' in these
performances ended with the sale of the records and that the
restriction [written on the label or packaging] did not save it; and that
if it did, the records themselves could not be clogged with a
servitude." 79 The practical effect was that broadcasters could not be
prevented from broadcasting phonorecords regardless of any
restrictive statements on the labels or the records. The broadcasters
had to pay the music publishers for broadcasting recordings of their
copyrighted musical compositions but not the performers whose
performances were embodied in the records.8 0
2. The Right to Make Phonorecords and Copies of a
Sound Recording
As record piracy began to flourish in the 1950s and 1960s, the
record companies who financed and thus claimed to own the rights in
the sound recordings were without recourse under the Copyright Act
of the day. Several other avenues of recourse were pursued by the
record companies.81 The first legal attempts by the record companies
to prevent record piracy were civil lawsuits in state courts invoking
the misappropriation doctrine enunciated in International News
76. The right of the copyright owner of the underlying musical composition "[t]o perform
the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition" was embodied in section
1(e) of the 1909 Copyright Act. Rights in the public performance of music were first recognized
in the United States in 1897. Supra note 1.
77. Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C. 1937) (apparently applying North
Carolina law); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
See also Pittsburgh Athletic Club v. KQV Broadcasting, 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938)
(enjoining unauthorized broadcasts of Pittsburgh Pirates home games).
78. RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 712 (1940).
79. Id. at 88.
80. A bill pending in the current Congress would require all broadcasters to pay the
performers for the use of their recorded performances. H.R. 848, 11Ith Cong. § 6, Ist Sess.
(2009).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 82-91.
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Service v. Associated Press.8 2 In these cases, the record companies
consistently prevailed.3
Another strategy pursued by the record companies was to seek
enactment of state criminal statutes outlawing unauthorized copying
of sound recording. 84 The constitutional validity of such statutes, at
least as applied to pre-February 15, 1972 sound recordings, was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California.85 On first
glance this effort was remarkably successful at one level, as almost
every state in the Union has enacted such a statute. These statutes,
however, are preempted by the Copyright Act with respect to all
sound recordings first fixed on or after February 15, 1972.87 Primarily
for this reason, the extent to which these statutes have resulted in any
recent convictions is apparently minimal to non-existent.
82. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
83. A & M Records, Inc. v. M.V.C. Distributing Corp., 574 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1978)
(applying Michigan law); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr.
798, 40 A.L.R.3d 553 (1969); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d
874 (1970); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 134 N.J. Super.
368, 341AA.2d 348 (App. Div. 1975); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc.
2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964); Metropolitan Opera Association v. Wagner-
Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 A.D.
632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951); United Artists Records, Inc. v. Eastern Tape
Corp., 19 N.C. App. 207, 198 S.E.2d 452 (1973); Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 11
N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d 414 (1971); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Custom
Recording Co., 258 S.C. 465, 189 S.E.2d 305 (1972); Mercury Record Productions, Inc. v.
Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163, 218 N.W.2d 705 (1974). See also Capitol Records
v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955) (applying New York law).
84. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-7 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 752.782 (2004);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 275.05 (McKinney 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-41.2 (West 2009); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 653h (West 1999).
85. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). For a detailed discussion of the
Goldstein decision, see Howard B. Abrams & Robert H. Abrams, Goldstein v. California:
Sound, Fury and Significance, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 174; Howard B. Abrams, Copyright,
Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits ofState Law Protection,
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 509, 327-32.
86. The record companies pursued the enactment of these state statutes even after
Congress included sound recordings in the subject matter of the Copyright Act through the 1971
Sound Recording Amendment. Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391(1971) (effective Feb. 15, 1972),
codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 26 & 101(e) (1976) (repealed 1976; repeal effective
Jan. 1, 1978). Equivalent provisions are incorporated in the current Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §§
102(a)(7), 106, 114 & 115 (2006)). Because the protections added to the Copyright Act by the
1971 Sound Recording Amendment were limited to sound recordings fixed on or after February
15, 1971, the record companies continued to pursue the adoption of these criminal statutes in
those states which had not enacted them prior to that date.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2006).
88. The author is unaware of any recent convictions arising under such state statutes. The
author's perception is that record pirates and counterfeiters concentrate almost exclusively on
current hit records which would be in demand because (1) the risks of unsold inventory would
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Still, another possible source of protection of sound recordings
from unauthorized duplication was civil actions by the music
publisher against the unauthorized duplicators. In Duchess Music
Corp. v. Stern,89 the Ninth Circuit held that the compulsory license
provision did not sanction the duplication of a sound recording
without consent of the owner of the sound recording even if the
compulsory license provisions were satisfied and the proper royalty
payments were made to the owners of the copyright in the underlying
musical composition.n. 90 Subsequent federal cases in the Third, Fifth,
and Tenth Circuits reiterated this conclusion. 91
These possible protections against unauthorized duplication,
however, were too episodic, diffuse and uncertain to satisfy the record
companies who lobbied Congress for federal legislation granting
copyright protection to the recorded sounds as distinct from the
underlying musical compositions being recorded. The result was the
1971 Sound Recording Amendment to the Copyright Act, granting
federal copyright protection to sound recordings fixed on or after
February 15, 1972.92
It is worth noting that the possibility of copyright protection of
sound recordings had been discussed by the 1909 Congress but was
ultimately rejected. The relevant 1909 House Report stated: "It is not
the intention of the committee to extend the right of copyright to the
mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the composer
or copyright proprietor the control, in accordance with the provisions
of the bill, of the manufacture and use of such devices."93 Given the
be minimal and (2) there is an ensured market which can be exploited quickly. See, e.g.,
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). This is one of only a few cases which resulted in a
conviction.
89. Duchess Music Corp. v. Stem, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
847 (1972).
90. Id.
91. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colo. Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285, aff'd on
rehearing en banc, 497 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1120 (1975); Jondora
Music Publ'g Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1974 as amended 1975),
cert. denied 421 U.S. 1012 (1975); Fame Publ'g Co. v. Ala. Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 842 (1975). See also infra text accompanying note 126
(statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 2005).
92. Statutory copyright protection was first provided for sound recordings by the 1971
Sound Recording Amendment. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (effective Feb. 15,
1972), codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 26 & 101(e) (1976) (repealed 1976; repeal
effective Jan. 1, 1978). Equivalent provisions are incorporated in the current Copyright Act. 17
U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(7), 106, 114 & 115 (2006).
93. See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 9 (1909) and S. REP. No. 60-1108, at 9 (1909).
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rise of record piracy and counterfeiting, as well as the perceived need
for federal protection, the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment is
understandable. The act, however, fails to clarify the problems created
by the overlap of copyrights in the underlying work and the derivative
works, evidencing Congress' failure to consider these issues.
C. Dominance ofRecord Companies and the Star System
There is no question that today the record companies and their
star artists dominate the music industry rather than the music
publishers and their composers and lyricists. 9 4 One hundred years
ago, the opposite was true. Today, as a result of mergers and buyouts,
there are four major multi-national music conglomerates in the world:
Warner Music Group, EMI, the Sony Music-BMG joint venture and
Universal Music Group. 95 Each of these conglomerates contains both
record companies and music publishing companies. 9 6 Within these
companies and within the music industry in general, it is the record
companies who are dominant. For example, it is the record companies
94. Many major recording artists do not author the material they record or author very
little of it. Obvious examples would include such mega-stars as Elvis Presley and Barbra
Streisand.
There are also examples of songs finding far greater popularity and record sales in the
recordings of well known star performers even when the songwriters are recording artists in
their own right. For just one obvious example, many of the songs of Kris Kristofferson, a
successful recording artist in his own right as well as a prolific songwriter, are far more popular
in the versions recorded by others, e.g., Me and Bobby McGee recorded by Janis Joplin, Roger
Miller, Gordon Lightfoot, The Grateful Dead, Jerry Lee Lewis, LeAnn Rimes and many, many
others, and Sunday Morning Coming Down recorded by Johnny Cash, Willie Nelson, Hank
Ballard and others. Kristofferson's recordings of Me and Bobby McGee and Sunday Morning
Coming Down both appear on his debut album, KRISTOFFERSON (1970).
Interestingly, today some genres of popular music (rock, hip hop) strongly tend to require the
performers write all or almost all of their music in the interests of "street credibility," while in
other genres (soul, country) this is of little or no importance.
94. This article does not consider the issue of whether or not the record companies over-
exploit recording artists.
95. RICHARD SCHULENBERG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY-AN INSIDER'S
VIEW OF THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE Music BUSINESS 21 (2005).
Each of these conglomerates contains many record labels. For example, the Warner Music
Group includes such labels as Warner, Elektra, Atlantic and Rhino; Sony Music-BMG includes
such labels as Sony, Columbia, Epic, Arista and RCA, the Universal Music Group includes such
labels as Universal, Island, Def Jam and Interscope; and EMI includes such labels as Capitol,
Angel, Virgin and Blue Note. Of course, each of these conglomerates includes many other
labels.
96. For example, the Warner Music Group includes Wamer-Tamerlane Publishing Corp.,
the Universal Music Group includes Universal Music Publishing Group, EMI includes EMI
Music Publishing, and Sony Music includes Sony/ATV Music Publishing which is co-owned by
the Michael Jackson Family Trust. All of these are among the world's major music publishers.
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who determine which artists are recorded, not the music publishers. It
is the record companies, not the music publishers, who decide which
songs are recorded, which are released, and which are promoted.
Is the compulsory license responsible for the current structure of
the music industry? It would have happened with or without the
compulsory license, however, the compulsory license contributed to
the speed and depth of this transformation by fixing the record
companies' cost of obtaining material to be recorded below a free
market price. This can be true even if the songwriter is also a
recording artist. 9 7 This factor is independent of the existence of the
compulsory license, and almost certainly would have led to the record
companies' domination of the music publishing industry, although
probably not to the same extent.
If there had been a recording right without the compulsory
license in the 1909 Copyright Act, it seems fair, although speculative,
to say that the music publishers would have had more financial
remuneration from their copyrighted works and thus more leverage in
the music industry, even to the point where they might have created
their own record companies.
D. The Impact of the Royalty Rate
1. Inflation
Easily obvious in hindsight, the flat rate fee of two cents per
copy manufactured set by section 1(e) would not keep up with
inflation. Thus, a one song "single" costing the consumer $1.00 in
1977 would yield the songwriter and music publisher the same $0.02
that they received from a one song phonorecord selling for $0.25 in
1909. Similarly, a twelve song LP in 1978, selling at retail from
somewhere between $10 to $15 in 1978 would yield a maximum of
$0.24 in the "mechanical" royalties flowing from the compulsory
license. Had the royalty rate for the compulsory license been pegged
at the ten percent of retail price that was in the proto-monopoly
agreement between some of the music publishers and the Aeolian
Company, those payments would have been from four to six times as
much.98 Thus, as these mechanical royalties grew into the major
source of income for songwriters and music publishers, there is a
valid argument that they were grievously shortchanged.
97. See supra note 94.
98. See supra text at note 23.
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This also contributed to the music publisher's loss of dominance
in the music industry. 99 Had the royalty rate been pegged at ten
percent of the retail price as the Aeolian contracts originally
provided, 00 it is clear the music publishers and songwriters would
have received more compensation for their contributions to recorded
music.
The impact of inflation was addressed in the 1976 Copyright
Revision Act.101 Section 115 of the 1976 Act retained the compulsory
license and initially increased the compulsory license's royalty rate to
2% cents per song or /2 cent per minute of playing time, whichever
was greater.102 Section 801(a) created an independent Copyright
Royalty Tribunal,10 3 and section 801(b) charged the Tribunal to make
periodic adjustments to the statutory royalty rate.104 The Copyright
Royalty Tribunal has since been replaced by a panel of three
Copyright Royalty Judges, 05 and the current rates are 9.1 cents per
song or 1.75 cents per minute of playing time, whichever is greater.'0 6
The primary practical effect of the statutory rate throughout its
history has been to establish an upper limit on what is charged for a
license to record a nondramatic musical composition. Discounts are
often made while premiums are so rare, if not unheard of, as to be
immaterial on any quantitative basis. 0 7 The other, perhaps less
obvious, effect is that the statutory rate establishes the familiar
parameters within which the music industry operates. It is a trivial
exercise for a record company to obtain a negotiated mechanical
license at the statutory rate. 08 Bargaining for a discount takes
99. Subsequently the inadequacy of the statutory license rate was addressed by the
adjustable royalties for the compulsory license provided by the 1976 Copyright Revision Act.
1976 Copyright Revision Act, supra note33, §§ 801-810, codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
801-805 (2006). But it can be argued that the compulsory mechanical rates still functions far
more as a ceiling than as a floor.
100. See supra text at note 23.
101. 1976 Copyright Revision Act, supra note 33.
102. Id. § 115 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006)).
Previously, the composer of an hour long symphony received only the same two cents as the
composer of a three minute popular song. This made the compulsory license an even greater
inequity to the composers of longer works.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 801(a) (2006).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b) (2006).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 801 (2006).
106. 37 C.F.R. § 255.3(m).
107. The author has heard rumors of songs commanding a premium over the compulsory
license, but has never seen such a license.
108. For most songs, particularly the ones whose copyright is owned by a major music
publisher, this entails nothing more than a telephone call to the Harry Fox Agency. See infra text
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somewhat more effort-typically a telephone call or series of calls-
and the request typically is resolved expeditiously one way or the
other as both parties will understand the parameters and jargon
created by the compulsory license provision.1 09
2. Ceilings and Floors
Another effect of the statutory royalty rate must be taken into
account. The statutory royalty rate has become a ceiling rather than a
floor for the earnings of music publishers and their composers and
lyricists from recordings. 0  Thus, even the most popular or
potentially most popular songs normally cannot obtain more than
statutory rate for their mechanical licenses in the current context of
the music industry except in the rarest of circumstances, if at all .'1
Often the income to the songwriter and music publisher may be
less. A typical scenario occurs when a star recording artist recording
for a major label with significant promotional and distributional
resources decides to record an unknown or relatively unknown song
by a songwriter who does not have much leverage in the industry.11
The record company will request the music publisher (which may be
the songwriter) to issue a mechanical license that discounts the
royalty rate from that provided under the statute. 13 The record
company will argue that the major artist will sell many records of the
song simply because of the star's fan base, thus resulting in greater
overall income to the music publisher and the songwriter than if the
at notes 131-134. If the song is not licensed through the Harry Fox Agency, the problem
becomes one of locating the music publisher which is not that difficult in most cases as the
music publisher wishes to be found so it can issue licenses for uses of its copyrighted music and
thus earn money. If there is to be no dickering over a discount, almost any music publisher will
be happy to issue a license for the making of a sound recording at the full statutory rate.
The bigger problem for the record companies is keeping track of the licenses and their
respective terms and rendering proper accountings.
109. Because the language of section 1(e) the 1909 Copyright Act spoke of "parts of
instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work" and "mechanical
reproductions," these compulsory licenses are called "mechanical licenses" and the resulting
royalties from such licenses are called "mechanical royalties" or simply "mechanicals" to this
day.
110. Peer Intern. Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1337 (91, Cir. 1990).
Ill. See, e.g., Papa's-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F.Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(Harry Connick, Jr. held subject to a contract clause entitling him to only seventy-five percent of
the statutory rate applicable to compulsory licenses under the Copyright Act).
112. Skyla Mitchell, Reforming Section 115: Escape from the Byzantine World of
Mechanical Licensing, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1239, 1248-9 (2006).
113. Ian Brereton, The Beginning of a New Age?: The Unconscionability of the "360-
Degree " Deal, 27 CARDOZO 167, 185 (2009).
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song was not recorded by the star.l14 The threat is that if the discount
is not granted, the song will not be recorded by the star. The requested
discount is typically twenty-five percent." 5
Even more disadvantageous for the music publisher and
songwriter is when the star insists that the star's music publishing
company be given a half interest in the copyright as a condition of
recording the song." 6  In this case, twenty-five percent of the
compulsory license royalty will be diverted to the star." 7 What makes
this worse for the original music publisher and songwriter is that this
also diverts twenty-five per cent of the song's other earnings to the
star.' 18
At the extreme, where the star has sufficient magnitude, it is not
altogether unknown for a star negotiating with a relatively unknown
songwriter to insist on ownership of all of the copyright and with it all
of the music publishing.1 9 Alternatively, an unscrupulous star might
insist on both being a co-publisher and being credited as a co-writer
of the song without making any contribution other than performing
114. Id. at 190 (2009).
115. Id.
116. In the prototypical contract between a songwriter without significant leverage and a
music publisher, the songwriter transfers the copyright in the song to the music publisher in
return for an advance against future earnings and a promise to pay the songwriter 50% of the
earnings that the publisher generates from the song. The amounts of the advance and the
percentage payable to the songwriters are, of course, negotiable, but this 50%-50% division is
quite frequent. Because this is the frequent practice, the customary jargon of the music industry
is to speak of a "publisher's share" and a "writer's share" of a song's earnings with the
understanding that each of these is 50% unless stated otherwise. Thus where the ownership of
the copyright is split evenly between the star's publishing company and another publishing
company, the star's company will receive half of the publisher's 50% of the earnings, which is
25% of the song's total earnings.
Where two music publishing companies both own a half interest in the copyright of a musical
composition, the arrangement is call co-publishing.
117. Thus the music publishing company owned by the star will receive 25% of the total
receipts (50% of the 50% that is the "publisher's share"). See supra note 116.
118. What makes this different to the songwriter, is that now the star, through his or her
music publishing company, will now receive 25% of the other income generated by the song
from sources other than the sale of recordings such as public performances (broadcasts including
webcasts), use of the song in film soundtracks (called synchronization rights or "sync" rights),
use of the song in ringtones, etc. See generally AL KOHN AND BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC
LICENSING, (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter KOHN ON Music LICENSING], and JEFFREY BRABEC &
TODD BRABEC, MUSIC MONEY AND SUCCESS-THE INSIDER'S GUIDE TO MAKING MONEY IN
THE MUSIC INDUSTRY (6th ed. 2008) [hereinafter MUSIC MONEY AND SUCCESS].
119. Suppose the star is almost certain to sell a million albums and maybe many more in
the United States alone. A mechanical license at the statutory rate for a million selling album
will generate $91,000 which leaves $45,500 for the songwriter's share plus half of whatever
other income the song may generate, which can be substantial. Id.
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it. 120 In this case the star also effectively gets fifty per cent of all of
the earnings of the song1 21 but also obtains an undeserved creative
credit. 122
The income of songwriter-performers is typically further reduced
by the record company's insistence on "controlled composition"
clauses in their recording contracts which usually tend reduce the
mechanical royalty payable to three-quarters of the statutory rate and
limit the number of songs on an album for which a mechanical royalty
is payable to ten. 123 Thus, a fifteen song CD album which would pay
$1.365 under the current ratel 24 will yield the music publisher only $
0.6825 or exactly half of what the statutory royalty rate
contemplates.12 5  Only those performer-songwriters who are
established with proven phonorecord sales can negotiate out of this
kind of provision in contracts with major record labels.
IV. INDUSTRY PRACTICE
It is well worth asking the question of how frequently the
compulsory mechanical license of section 115 is invoked in actual
practice. The experience of the Copyright Office is that it was and is
rarely used except for a brief period in the 1960s.12 6 From the
120. Id.
121. As a co-publisher, the star gets half of the publisher's share and as a co-writer, the
star gets half of the writer's share. Id.
122. The ethical implications are obvious, particularly in an industry where creative credit
enhances reputations and thus earning power. Authors of musical compositions, like the authors
of many other kinds of works, are not included in the Copyright Act's provisions for moral
rights. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106A with Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, done Sept. 9, 1886, entered into force, May 4, 1896, Paris Revision of July 24, 1971,
article 6bis (effective Oct. 10, 1974), entered into force for the United States March 1, 1989
[hereinafter Berne Convention], S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), reprinted at I Copyright L.
Rep. (CCH) % 11,400-79.
123. 9 ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRACTS-NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING GUIDE, I
159.03[2][b] & Form 159-3 clause 8 (Donald C. Farber & Peter A. Cross ed. 2008); M.
WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC-THE DEFINITIVE
GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 21-22 (9th ed. 2003).
124. 1909 Copyright Act, supra note 1.
125. The performer-songwriter's receipts will be reduced by whatever is the music
publisher's share of such income unless the performer-songwriter has retained complete
ownership of their copyrights.
126. Music Licensing Reform Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., Ist Sess. (2005) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat07l205.html.
Also symptomatic of the infrequency of actual use of the compulsory license is that none of the
Annual Reports of the Register of Copyright for the years 2001 through 2007 consider this
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Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, in a prepared statement
submitted to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 2005,
described the historical pattern of use of the statutory mechanical
license as follows:
[T]he "mechanical" license as structured under the 1909 Copyright
Act was infrequently used until the era of tape piracy in the late
1960s. During this period, the "pirates" inundated the Copyright
Office with notices of intention to utilize the compulsory license,
many of which contained hundreds of song titles. The music
publishers refused to accept such notices and any proffered royalty
payments since they did not believe that reproduction and
duplication of an existing sound recording fell within the scope of
the compulsory license. After this flood of filings passed, the use
of the license appears to have again became [sic] almost non-
existent; up to this day, the Copyright Office receives very few
notices of intention. 127
In 2008 the Copyright Office received 274 Notices of Intent to invoke
the compulsory license. 12 8 In 2007, 382 Notices of Intent were
received.12 9 There are no figures available as to how many of these
Notices of Intent were filed either because negotiated licenses were
refused or because the songs at issue were "orphan works" where the
copyright owner could not be contacted.130
By comparison to the number of mechanical licenses issued by
the Harry Fox Agency,' 3 this is miniscule. In 2008, the Harry Fox
statistic worth reporting. These reports can be found at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2006/index.html.
127. Id.
128. Telephone Interview with Mark DiNapoli, Assistant Chief, Examining Div., United
States Copyright Office (July 13, 2009).
129. Id.
130. The term "orphan work" is used in copyright jargon to describe copyrighted works
whose copyright owner cannot be located. This becomes a problem when someone wants to use
a copyrighted work legitimately, is willing to negotiate a license that would compensate the
copyright owner, but cannot locate the copyright owner through reasonable efforts. This
problem is not limited to music but covers many other kinds of works as well.
For a fuller introduction of this topic, see The "Orphan Works" Problem and Proposed
Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I l0th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 13, 2008) (statement of Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat03l308.html.
131. The Harry Fox Agency is a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Music
Publishers Association, the principal trade association of music publishers, and issues
mechanical licenses on behalf of its publisher members. The Harry Fox Agency is by far the
largest issuer of mechanical licenses in the United States today. Although no precise percentage
can be determined, it is fair to say that the Harry Fox Agency probably issues well over half of
all the mechanical licenses issued in the United States today.
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Agency issued over 2.44 million mechanical licenses on behalf of its
members of which 530,000 were for permanent digital downloads.13 2
In 2007, the Harry Fox Agency issued over 1.51 million mechanical
licenses.133 Thus, in 2008, the number of Notices of Intent filed in the
Copyright Office amounted to 0.0143% of the number of mechanical
license issued by the Harry Fox Agency even after subtracting out the
permanent digital download licenses from the Harry Fox total. 134
Given that the usage of the statutory compulsory license is
minimal, the next question is why? First of all, the requirements
placed upon the maker of the licensed sound recording under a
compulsory mechanical license are onerous in comparison to standard
industry practice. 35 The points of comparisons used are the Harry
Fox Agency mechanical license136 and the three sample mechanical
licenses that are set forth in Kohn on Music Licensing.'3 ' Royalty
payments under a purely compulsory license are made monthly and
are due on the twentieth day of the following month. 38 The typical
industry practice is that royalty payments are made quarterly and are
due on the forty-fifth day or the fifteenth day of the second month
A blank copy of the basic Harry Fox Agency mechanical license is attached to this article as
Appendix A with the permission of the Harry Fox Agency.
132. Press Release, Harry Fox Agency, HFA Collects almost $307.1 Million in Royalties
for its over 37,000 Affiliated Publishing Clients in 2008 (Mar. 24, 2009) (available at
http://harryfox.com/docs/2008HFARecapPR.pdf). The author is indebted to Laurie Jakobsen of
the Harry Fox Agency for directing the author to this press release and the one cited in note 133
infra.
133. Press Release, Harry Fox Agency, HFA Collects almost $394 Millions in Royalties
for its nearly 35,000 Affiliated Publishers in 2007 (Mar. 17, 2008), available at
http://harryfox.com/docs/2007HFARecapPR31708.pdf.
Also, even though it is not directly on point to the topic of this paper, note the decline in
revenues from 2007 to 2008, which arguably reflects the impact of unauthorized peer-to-peer
file sharing over the internet.
134. Although accurate figures are not available, it is fair to say the Harry Fox Agency
issues well over half of the mechanical licenses in the United States. The author's guess would
be that it is in the 60% to 70% range of all mechanical licenses issued.
135. See "Section 115 of the Copyright Act: In need of update? ": Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. (Mar. 11, 2004) (Statement of Jonathan Potter, Executive Director, Digital Media
Association), available at
http://www.digmedia.org/index.php?option-com-docman&task-docdownload&gid=59
(criticizing HFA's cumbersome licensing practices as contrary to common business practice).
136. A blank copy of the basic Harry Fox Agency mechanical license is reproduced as
Appendix A to this article with the permission of the Harry Fox Agency.
137. KOHN ON Music LICENSING, supra note 118 app. to ch. 12, at 709-717. These are
sufficiently typical of the mechanical licenses used in the music industry that further examples
would be redundant. See, e.g., MUSIC MONEY AND SUCCESS, supra note 118, at 479-80.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(5) (2006).
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following the accounting period. 3 9 Monthly payments under a
compulsory license must be made under oath and must comply with
requirements set forth by the Register of Copyrights.14 0 The
compulsory statement also requires an annual statement that is
certified by a certified public accountant.141 In contrast, the typical
industry license does not call for the monthly statements to be made
under oath nor does it require a certified annual statement.142 Finally,
if the copyright owner does not receive the monthly or annual
statements under a compulsory license when due, they can give
written notice of the default to the licensee that "unless the default is
remedied within thirty days from the date of the notice, the
compulsory license will be automatically terminated [and] [s]uch
termination renders either the making or the distribution of
phonorecords, or both, of all phonorecords for which the royalty has
not been paid, actionable as acts of infringement." 4 3
These requirements are sufficiently different from the normal
business practices of the major record companies that they will not
avail themselves of a compulsory license unless absolutely necessary,
even to the extent of dropping songs off of albums. In particular, the
record companies claim that their accounting departments are geared
for quarterly payments and it is too big a dislocation to provide
monthly statements in only twenty days. Nor are they at all happy
with the idea of paying for certified public accountants to provide
yearly statements.
On the flip side, this can work to the advantage of the songwriter
or music publisher that does not wish to license their music for other
recordings. Consider the following fact situation. A publicly unknown
recording artist or group that writes its own material has just released
a record with a song on it that is in a slow process of becoming a hit.
A famous major artist on a major label wants to record that song and
is capable of flooding the market, airwaves and webcasts with its
version of song in very short order. If this happens, the unknown artist
may be preempted from its chance at building a career. Provided the
139. KOHN ON Music LICENSING, supra note 118 app. to ch. 12, at 709-717. See, e.g.,
Music MONEY AND SUCCESS, supra note 118, at 479.
140. Id. These requirements are set out at 37 C.F.R. § 201.19.
141. Id. These too are subject to the requirements promulgated by the Register of
Copyrights. 37 C.F.R. § 201.19.
142. See supra note 53-57.
143. 17 U.S.C. § 1l5(c)(6). This last provision is found in two of the three contracts given
in KOHN ON Music LICENSING, supra note 118, and in the Harry Fox Agency Mechanical
License reproduced in Appendix A.
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unknown artist controls the copyrights in its musical compositions,
the artist can refuse to issue a mechanical license to the famous artist.
It is quite probable that this will prevent the cover recording,'" which
would kill the original. Therefore, to the extent that complying with
the requirements for a compulsory license will prevent potential cover
recordings, the composers and lyricists who control the copyrights in
their musical compositions are effectively in the position of having
the same power as if there were no compulsory license provision.
V. AND THE FuTuRE
But is it sound to retain the compulsory license, notwithstanding
its Congressional blessing? This central question can be broken down
into a series of related subordinate questions. If nothing more than
inertia keeps this system in place, should it be allowed to continue to
displace free negotiations between the parties? Who is benefitted and
who is harmed? To what extent does the change in the landscape of
the music industry to its current domination by four major
multinational record conglomerates1 45 alter the analysis? What does
the infrequency of use of the actual compulsory license tell us?
A. The Statutory Guidelines
These questions go to the utility and efficacy of the royalty rate
proceedings in front of the Copyright Royalty Judges as compared to
a free or at least freer market. Thus, before attempting to answer the
question of whether the compulsory mechanical license should be
removed or retained, we need to consider the current parameters
determining the compulsory license royalty rate.
Section 801(b)(1) of the Copyright Act mandates the guidelines
the Copyright Royalty Judges are to follow in making their rate
determinations for statutory mechanical licenses:
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public.
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for his or her
creative work and the copyright user a fair income under existing
economic conditions.
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the
copyright user in the product made available to the public with
respect to the relative creative contribution, technological
144. In the terminology of the music industry, a "cover recording" is a later recording of a
song that was previously recorded by another recording artist or group.
145. See text accompanying note 94.
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contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the
opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their
communication.
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the
industries involved and on generally prevailing industry
practices. 146
It can readily be argued that these guidelines accomplish little
that a free market would not accomplish, and, in part, even contribute
to the maintenance of an artificial status quo. Do the rates that would
be charged in a free market minimize or somehow constrict the
availability of creative works to the public? In such other copyright
based industries as motion pictures or books and magazines, where
the prices for use of the underlying creative work are determined by
private negotiations, there is no lack of works vying for the public's
choice. Why should music be any different? Here we run into the
argument that the public would have fewer choices of different artists
recording the musical composition if there were no compulsory
license. This seems doubtful for at least two reasons. First, it may be
in the interest of the music publisher to have as many artists as
possible record their song, so this would be a strong incentive for the
music publishers to negotiate non-exclusive licenses.147 Second, rival
record companies can and do compete with each other by offering
different music and different artists as well as by having different
recordings of the same song.148 Thus, record companies that could not
get mechanical licenses on previously recorded songs would need
other avenues to reach the market and, in doing so, would bring new
music and new artists to the public's attention. Therefore, the Register
of Copyrights' initial contention that the public "would get recordings
of a greater number and variety of musical works" 49 in the absence of
a compulsory license seems correct.' 50
Also, there is no reason to assume that arm's length negotiations
between the music publishers and the record companies will not
produce price points that make creative works abundantly available to
the public. After all, both the potentially willing buyer (the record
company) and the potentially willing seller (the music publisher) will
not earn anything from the work unless it reaches the public.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A)-(D).
147. 1961 REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 33, at 34.
148. See id. at 34.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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Lumping together the "fair return"-"fair income" 15' requirement
with the requirement of considering "the relative creative
contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk,
and contribution to the opening of new markets for creative
expression and media for their communication"l52 in determining a
royalty rate, we see that it begs the question of whether this is best
determined by a panel of Copyright Royalty Judges or by the parties
to an arm's length negotiation. By negotiating individually, the parties
could take into account the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding each individual song, recording artist and record
company. This will lead to price differentiation but that is not
inherently wrong.
Finally, the command that the royalty rate shall be designed to
"minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries
involved and on generally prevailing industry practices"' 5 3 is, on its
face, a command to maintain the status quo. To some extent this must
prevent or hinder the music industry from adopting new methods of
doing business that may be needed to adapt to changing economic and
popular factors. It also may chill the music industry from seeking
better functioning alternatives to present mechanical licensing
methods.
After examining the statutory guidelines for determining the
compulsory royalty rate, it is fair to say that they seem to have been
written to preserve the current structure, institutions and relationships
of the recorded music industry. In short, they reinforce the status quo.
But this does not make the status quo either right or optimal.
B. An Alternative Reality
Let us now imagine a music industry without the compulsory
license. 154
It seems highly probable that the first result would be price
differentiation among songs. A song that was or seemed likely to be a
major seller would command a significant premium over the typical
"album filler." A new song with a new release might command some
premium based on its perceived potential. The mechanical royalties
151. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(B) (2006).
152. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(C) (2006).
153. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(D) (2006).
154. As there has never been a free market for mechanical licenses unless you count the
pre-1909 Copyright Act era, there is obviously no data from which to draw empirical
conclusions.
243
244 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 26
on rereleases of old records would, in most cases, probably be
discounted substantially.
In some cases, this would require both the music publishers and
the record companies to estimate market potential and take the
attendant risks of miscalculation, but should they be artificially
insulated from the risks? After all, when the music publishers
negotiate with their other licensees (motion picture producers,
television producers, advertisers, video game manufacturers, etc.),
both sides are required to make these judgments. Neither record
companies nor music publishers are incapable of intelligent
negotiations.
Another result is that there would be some exclusive licenses.
Before asking if this is good or bad, the necessary prior question is
why this would occur. The answer lies in the shift of dominance in the
music industry from the music publishers to the record companies and
their stars."' The record companies or recording artists would often
be in a position to insist on an exclusive license and would do so to
prevent other record companies or recording artists from competing
for the audience for the song. This would prevent competing record
companies from offering alternative versions of the same musical
compositions. They would still be able to compete, however, by
offering recordings of other artists and other musical compositions.
The Register of Copyrights has contended that this would increase the
number of musical compositions available to the public.' 56 This may
well be the case, but whether the increase in the recording of other
music would be infinitesimal or significant is not clear as record
companies today do in fact compete with each other primarily on this
basis. 157
The impact on the music publishers, and thus on the songwriters,
is harder to estimate. On the one hand, it can be argued that an
exclusive license would justify a higher royalty rate, which would
offset at least some of the loss of income from cover records that
could not then be licensed. But this is true only if the music publisher
has sufficient negotiating power to insist on a high enough premium
155. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
156. 1961 REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 33, at 34.
157. In some areas, such as classical recordings, where there may be many recordings of
the same piece, particularly public domain works, the consumer choice of which version to buy
may be heavily influenced by the recording artist. For example, which recording of Beethoven's
Fifth Symphony do you prefer, the Chicago Symphony's conducted by George Solti or the
Berlin Philharmonic's, conducted by Herbert von Karajan, or one of myriad others? There are
differences.
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to offset the loss of income from cover records. If they do not have
sufficient negotiating power, then the abolition of the compulsory
license would mean an overall loss to the songwriter and music
publisher.
There are other possibilities, such as a mechanical license that is
exclusive for a limited period of time so as to prevent a newly
released record from being swamped by cover recordings made by
established famous recording artists.158 Or the exclusivity can be tied
to the amount of the income stream generated by the recordings over
time. Again, these are contrary to current practice-which has its own
momentum-and would require the music publisher or songwriter to
have sufficient bargaining leverage to insist on such clauses. Given
the present power balance in the record industry, the extent to which
these or other variations on terminable exclusivity would occur is
problematic.
Some music publishers believe that on an overall basis they are
better off financially than they would be if the compulsory
mechanical license were repealed.'5 9 But is this fear realistic?
Perhaps. Perhaps not. On one hand, there is a certain respect that must
be accorded the judgment of the majority of the music publishing
industry. On the other hand, as the Register of Copyrights has pointed
out, there is evidence that in those countries whose copyright regimes
do not have a compulsory mechanical license, there are significant
numbers of non-exclusive licenses:
Our compulsory license in the United States is also an anomaly.
Virtually all other countries that at one time provided for this
compulsory license have eliminated it in favor of private
negotiations and collective licensing administration. Many
countries permit these organizations to license both the public
performance right and the reproduction and distribution rights for a
musical composition, thereby creating "one-stop shopping" for
music licensees and streamlined royalty processing for copyright
160
owners.
158. In licensing music for advertising purposes, time limited exclusive rights are quite
common. Typically, there is a set period with options for the advertiser to extend the exclusivity
if it is decided the campaign is to be continued. Licenses for music in advertising may also use
such criteria as product classification or geographic area as a basis for exclusivity. The more
exclusivity, the more the advertiser pays the music publisher.
159. See supra text at notes 53-56.
160. Music Licensing Reform, Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., Ist Sess., text accompanying note 24 (July 12, 2005)
(statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (available at
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The approach suggested by the Register of Copyrights would roll a
number of currently separate intermediaries '6 into one and replace
rates determined under the statute with industry wide bargaining.
Obviously, this approach threatens the existence and business models
of the existing intermediaries, who thus favor the continuation of the
present system.
Also, if there were industry wide negotiations, who would
represent the music publishers? In fact, many of the world's largest
music publishers are also parts of the same music conglomerates as
the major record companies,' 62 which would create an inherent
conflict of interest. Because the record companies usually have more
clout than the music publishers within their specific corporate
structures,163 the record companies would probably benefit from this
conflict of interest at the expense of the music publishers and
songwriters. If this practical problem can be solved, the case for
industry-wide private negotiations and a single collective licensing
administration becomes stronger.
C. Fundamental Principles and Moral Rights
1. Principles
Finally, it is worthwhile to consider the basic issue of whether
the copyright owner should be able to control the making of
derivative works. For all forms of copyrighted works other than non-
dramatic musical compositions, this is the case.'" Moreover, the
Register of Copyrights has identified this as "the fundamental
principle of copyright-that the author is to have the exclusive right
to control the commercial exploitation of his work-should apply to
the recording of music, as it is applied to all other kinds of works and
to other means of exploiting music."
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat071205.html).
161. For example, the performing rights societies (ASCAP, BMI and Sesac) act as
collection and distribution agencies for the music publishers with respect to public performances
of nondramatic musical compositions. The Harry Fox Agency acts as a collection and
distribution agency for many music publishers with respect to mechanical licenses. The AARC
acts as a collection and distribution agency for moneys coming due under the Audio Home
Recording Act. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237
(1992), codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1000-1010 (2006). There are others.
162. See supra note 96.
163. The author is unshakably convinced that this proposition is accurate, but could not
find a reputable published written statement that so states. There also are none that refute it.
164. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
165. Supra text accompanying note 39.
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The argument that it is essential that there be multiple versions
of a song available to the public has some traction, only because it is
so frequently repeated by the proponents of maintaining the
compulsory license. 16 6 Yet, it is subject to serious challenge. First,
there is the counter-argument that the repeal of the compulsory
license will be the death knell of non-exclusive licenses is
questionable. 167 Also, if there are exclusive licenses, they may yield
the compensating benefit of a greater variety of musical compositions
being recorded. It seems obvious that a recording artist who has been
denied a license to record a given nondramatic musical composition
will simply find a different one to record.
Perhaps more importantly, the absence of compulsory licenses
for the preparation of otherwise unauthorized derivative works does
not seem to have led to any particular deprivation for the public in
any of copyright's other areas. 16 8 Has it hurt Spiderman fans that this
creation is available only through Marvel Comics or their licensees?
The evidence from this instance is that a copyright owner will flood
the market with derivative works.169 This indicates that if a record
company had an exclusive right to record a certain musical
composition and there was a perceived demand for alternate versions,
the record company would in fact record an alternate version with
other recording artists. Has it been harmful that only Warner Bros.
can make movies of Harry Potter? Here we have a situation where the
consumer will not be confronted with multiple versions and
reiterations. It is submitted that Harry Potter fans do not feel deprived
by J. K. Rowling's monopoly control over Harry Potter derivatives
and her reported intent that there will be no more Harry Potter
stories. 170 Indeed, these and other copyright owners will argue that
166. David R. Goodfriend, Reply Comments to Echostar Satellite L.L.C., Section 109
Report to Congress at 9, Oct. 1, 2007,
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/section 109/replies/echostar-reply.pdf
167. Supra text accompanying notes 39 - 43.
168. See, E.g. THE DA VINCI CODE (Columbia Pictures 2006), THE DEVIL WEARS PRADA
(20th Century Fox 2006), MEMOIRS OF A GEISHA (Spyglass Entertainment 2005).
169. In addition to the Spiderman movies, toys, T-shirts, and other embodiments, there are
the multiple Spiderman comic series, e.g. THE AMAZING SPIDERMAN, THE SPECTACULAR
SPIDERMAN, THE WEB OF SPIDERMAN, etc. Similar observations can be made about Superman,
Batman, The X-Men and others.
170. Although Rowlings has indicated that she may write future works set in the fantasy
universe inhabited by Harry Potter, she has said that the Harry Potter saga is now complete and
at an end. Nancy Gibbs, Person of the Year 2007: JK. Rowling, Time (2007),
http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/personoftheyear/article/0,28804,1690753_1695388_16
95436,00.html
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their financial returns, and thus their incentives to create, are
maximized by exclusivity.
It must also be mentioned that the musical works contained in
dramatic works, such as operas and musical plays, are not subject to a
compulsory license.17 ' It is worth noting that frequently there are
multiple recorded versions of the more popular songs from these
operas and musicals even though they could be subject to exclusive
licenses. 172
Is music any different? The argument will be that music is
different because it does not reach its audience without performers
who add their creative input. But is not the same true of motion
picture scripts? Here the argument is truly joined. The point is the
motion picture industry is dominated by the major motion picture
studios which employ or acquire whatever rights they need from the
authors, actors, directors, cinematographers and others. There is also
no question that the studios rather than the creative contributors reap
the greatest financial rewards from the motion pictures they produce,
although some but not all of the creative contributors may be
handsomely compensated.
If the contemporary fears of the loss of the compulsory
mechanical license are correct, the same pattern could occur in the
music industry with the record companies in the role of the motion
picture studios. Assume this would hurt the music publishers-and
thus the songwriters, composers and lyricists-financially. If
sympathies are with the composers and lyricists who create the
underlying works, this argues for retaining the compulsory license.
But would this necessarily be the case? However, there also would be
cases where the authors of musical works and their music publishers
would acquire greater rather than less control over their musical
compositions and thus increase their returns rather than continually
bumping into the ceiling of the statutory rate. The truth is we do not
know which result would predominate.
2. Moral Rights
One element certainly unforeseen by the 1909 Congress is the
issue of the moral rights of a composer of music. The point cannot be
171. The compulsory license of section 115 is limited to "nondramatic musical works." 17
U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
172. E.g. ANDREW LLOYD WEBBER, ALL I ASK OF You (Polydor 1987), also recorded by
SARAH BRIGHTMAN AND CLIFF RICHARD (Polydor 1986); VICKI SHEPARD (Redzone Records
1999); BARBARA STREISAND (Sony 1989).
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emphasized too strongly. If there were no statutory license, the
copyright owner has the choice of granting or not granting the
requested permission, with or without conditions or restrictions, based
on whatever factors seem relevant to the copyright owner. These may
or may not be purely financial. 73 Certainly, there is room for the
exercise of aesthetic judgment as well as other personal concerns.
This is not so in the case of a sound recording of a non-dramatic
musical composition. 174 In addition to the obvious financial
dimension of the making of an unsanctioned derivative work, there is
a moral rights dimension. What if a composer objects to the rendition
of the composer's works by a certain performer because of revulsion
over that performer's style? Should any songwriter have the right to
object if some other performer does a version of their compositions
that they regard as a perversion? Or should the songwriter be able to
prevent the performer from recording it in the first place?175
The counter-argument is that the composers and songwriters, or
at least those who control the copyrights of the works they created,
could just bitch all the way to the bank with the proceeds of the
statutory license. But shouldn't they have the choice? Not every
author is motivated solely by money, and artistic integrity, although
hard to quantify, is nonetheless a concern of many authors in many
fields. 7 6 The statutory license precludes this and effectively bars the
exercise of moral rights in the context of versions of non-dramatic
musical compositions. The point here is not to examine the failures of
the United States to genuinely implement the moral rights to which it
pays lip service, '7 but rather to point out that even if the United
173. Even if the author or copyright owner is motivated purely by financial concerns, there
can be instances where turning down a request for a mechanical license may be advantageous in
the long run. A simple illustration would be when a recording by an artist with modest sales
projections would prevent a recording by an artist with significantly higher sales projections.
174. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
175. The defense of fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006), would be available to anyone
accused of infringement if they could show the factors governing such determinations weighed
in their favor. The case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), posed the
issue of whether 2 Live Crew's derivative rap version of Roy Orbison's well-known recording
of Pretty Woman infringed the copyright in the song in the absence of a license. In its opinion,
the Court set forth the criteria it thought should be applied in future parody fair use cases.
176. See, Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1976); Jim Henson Prods.,
Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 259, 261, 286-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Geisel
v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 333, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
177. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006), with Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works art. 6 bis, done Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris on July 24,
1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Oct. 10, 1974, entered into force for the United States March
1, 1989) [hereinafter Berne Convention], reprinted in I Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) f1 11,408.
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States did have adequate protections for moral rights, they are
effectively nullified by the statutory license of section 115.178
VI.Conclusion
Should the compulsory mechanical license be removed or
retained?
As a practical matter this is not likely to happen any time soon.
In the long term, it is harder to say whether it should be kept or
discarded.
The conclusion of this article, with some hesitation, is that the
mechanical license should be repealed.
Reverting to the most fundamental principle of all, the United
States Constitution provides: "The Congress Shall Have Power .. . To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."l 7 9 The underlying purpose of
copyright is to encourage the creation of intellectual works.s 0 The
mechanism to encourage this creation is the granting of exclusive
rights to the authors of the works.181 It is submitted that the
Constitution envisions a system where the making of any derivative
work is dependent on the consent of the author or the author's
successor in interest. This is perhaps the largest factor.
The four other factors that have influenced this conclusion are
(1) the total lack of moral rights in any form under the present
system,182 (2) the debatability of the assertion that repeal of the
compulsory license will result in sufficient quantity of exclusive
licenses that will not only be exclusive but will harm the public
interest,' 83  (3) the disappearance of the original anti-monopoly
justification for the compulsory license,184 and (4) a belief that private
178. 17 U.S.C. § 115.
179. U.S.CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The author's views of the interpretation of the Copyright-Patent Clause of the Constitution are
set out more fully at HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT §§1:1 through 1:20 (18th
ed. 2008).
180. 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, The LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1:3, at 1-10 (18th ed. 2008).
18 1. Id.
182. In this scenario, the author will be able to exercise his moral rights effectively only if
the author retains control of the copyright, but this occurs in a reasonable number of cases.
183. There are actually two separate components to this argument for retention of the
compulsory license: first, that abolition of the compulsory license will result in exclusive
licenses, and, second, that this will be harmful to the public interest. Both of these assertions
have no proof.
184. Any danger of a powerful monopoly or oligopoly dominating the recorded music
industry today comes from the major record companies, not the music publishers.
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negotiation, whether on the basis of industry wide negotiations or
one-on-one negotiations will result in fairer treatment of the authors
of non-dramatic musical compositions.'
What do you think?
185. It is clear that even today the compulsory license royalty rates are a ceiling, not a
floor. Negotiations about rates, if any, are always about the amount of the discount, even in the
case of previously unrecorded musical work to which the compulsory license is inapplicable.
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APPENDIX A
THE HARRY FOX AGENCY, INC. 601 WEST 26TH STREET, 5th FLOOR, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10001
A SUBSIDIARY OF NATIONAL MUSIC PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION. INC
TEST LICENSEE 1
I11 THIRD AVENJE
NEW YORK
07'309 RP
LICENSE NO. 109-040-9798
MARCH 16, 2009
SY 10017 TRX.NO. 18278414
Refer to provisions hereof reproduced on reverse side varying terms of comnpulsory license
provision of Copyright Act. The following is supplementory thereto:
f.. SONG CODE: TO550V
TITLF: TEST WRITERS: TEST
AV,: TEST AKA
1TN1COME PARTICIPANT(S):
VEST 01 PtBLISHER 100%
RECORD NO : (CC) TEST
ART IST: TEST
ROYAT.'Y RATE: STATUTORY
PTAY:NG TIME 5 MINUTES OR LESS
ADDT'IONAL PROVISIONS:
VIEE AUT2ORITY -iEREUNDER IS LIMITED TO THE MANUFACTURE AND DISTRIBUTION
PI:ONORECORDS SOLELY IN THE UNITED STAVES, ITS TERRITORIES AND POSSESSIONS
AND NOT ELSEWHERS.
CREDIT 1N RECARD TO ALl. PFONORECCRDS MeANUFACTJRED, DTSTRIBUTED AND/OR
COLD "EREUNDER. YOU SHALL USE YOUR BEST EFFORTS TO INCLUDE IN VHE LABEL COPY
'F ALL SUCH PHONORECORDS, OR ON THE PERMANENT CONTAINERS OF ALL SUCH
:HONORECORDS, PRINTED WRTER/ PUBLISHER CREDIT IN THE FORM OF THE NAMES OF THE
.RITER(S) AND THE PUBLISHER(S) OF THE COPYRIGHTED WORK.
ALBUM: iIsT
DATE OF RELEASE: JANUARY 2009 RECORD LABEL: TEST
JNIIGURATION CODE: CD - VOMPACT DISC (AIUK)
LICENSE: COPY:
TES'- LICENSEE 1
Very truly yours,
THE HARRY FOX AGENCY, INC.
We ego reeipt o oCOPY hereof:
TEST LICENSEE
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APPENDIX A
PAGE 2
You rae advised us, in our capacity as Agent for the Publisher(s) referred on in (B) supra, that you
wish to obtain a coimpulsory license to mnake and to distribute phonorecords of the copyrighted work
referred Ie in A- supra, under the cutmpulsory license provision of Section 115 of the Copyright Act.
Upon your doing so, you shall have all the righit which are granted to, and all the obligations which
are imposed upon. users of said copyrighted work under the rompilsory license provision of the Copy.
right Act. afte phosnorecords of the copyrighted work have been distributed to the public in the United
States under rhe aithorily of he copyrihit owner by another person, except that with respect to
phonorecords thereof made and distributed heerrioder
. Youi shall pay roiyaitres ani .. cInt o u.s as Agent for and on behalf of said Publisherls)
qarterly withir, ty- five days after the end of each calridar quarter, on the basis of phonorecords
masse and dismbutel:
2 ior such PhunorecOsis orade and distributed. the royalty shall he the statutory rate in
uffect at the rume tr Ir poiorrecorrd is trde. ercept as otherwise stated it ICt supra:
3 Tis r.pulsory license covers ani is Imited to one parurilar recording of said copyright.
ed wIk as porforneI by ie astist and on ttre poororecori 'umber identified in lCi supia; and this com
pulsory license dues not sisersede nor in any wij affect any pfior agreements now in effect respecting
phonorecords n' said copyrighted work.
4 . ' Ire evr enit y fail to eccount in is arid pay royalties as herein provided for. said
Publishers) or his Agent mvay give written notice to you that, unless the default is remedied within 30
days from the date if tie lotire, this compulsory license wdi be anuoatically terminated. Such termina
ton shall render either The imaking or the distribution, or both, of all phonorecords for which royalties
have not been paid, actionable as acts of infringerrent under, and hulv subject to the remedies provided
by, the COiyrnghl At:
5. you ied Is serve or Ib the not e of intentin to obtain a conpulsory license sequired
by the Copyrghrt At
6. Addutirsual Provisis are orro cetuder :.Dl supra.
* * *
